The cell lineage of the muscles of the Drosophila head

Using a cell marker mutation the cell lineage of the muscles of the Drosophila head are traced out. Three sets of muscles separated by lineage restrictions are observed, even when cells are marked as early as the blastoderm stage. Each set underlies the derivatives of one of the three pairs of imaginal discs which differentiate to form the epidermis of the adult head. Clones of the homoeotic mutation engrailed (en^10) were apparently normal in the muscles of the head. The muscle clone frequency, at the blastoderm stage, in each hemisegment of the fly is similar, indicating an equal partitioning of cells during segmentation

Eliciting Information Requirements for Data Warehouses,

Information Requirements Determination (IRD) has generally been recognized as a critical step in the software development process. The determination of information requirements is one of the most crucial stages in the software design and development process (Montezemi 1988). It is during this stage that the greatest degree of interaction occurs between the analyst and the user (Lauer et al. 1992). Information technology practitioners have generally recognized how requirements determination is different in data warehouses and very large databases. (Dacha, 1998). This study takes explores whether current knowledge of information requirements determination (IRD) can apply to the context of data warehouses and very large databases

Consumer Law’s Equity Gap

This Article is about the views that shape and constrain the development of consumer law. Consider the market for short-term, highcost loans. Policymakers tend to justify intervening in these markets on inefficiency grounds (consumers exhibit present bias) and rarely on equitable grounds (these loans cost too much). Why? One recent explanation suggests that policymakers may focus on inefficiency because they believe access to credit is essential for social and economic development. In this Article, I offer an alternative explanation. The lack of equity in consumer law is not just a function of narrow conceptions internal to consumer law but the external view that the law should prioritize efficiency and ignore equity. The dominant rationale for this view is that redistribution through legal rules distorts economic behavior more than redistribution through an income tax. Here, I discuss the longstanding and recent critiques of this rationale and build on those critiques to show why it is a fundamental mistake to ignore distribution in consumer law. In particular, background legal rules shape consumer demand in individual markets. These background conditions may mean that seemingly irrational exchanges are, in fact, rational. An approach tethered to consumer preferences may struggle to justify altering the terms of rational exchanges. To overcome this problem, I suggest that we center distribution in the way we justify interventions and conceptualize solutions to problems in consumer financial markets. I detail what centering distribution in consumer law might look like and conclude by considering some objections to redistributive policies in consumer law

The Case Against the Debt Tax

Americans are increasingly agitating for debt relief. In the last decade, there have been national campaigns to cancel student debt, credit card debt, and mortgage debt. These national campaigns have paralleled local efforts to cancel taxi medallion debt, carceral debt, and lunch debt. But as the public increasingly pursues broad-scale debt relief outside bankruptcy, they face an important institutional obstacle: canceled debt is generally taxable. The taxability of canceled debt is often raised by opponents as an objection to broad debt cancellation and potentially discounts the value of any debt relief. The conventional account for why we tax canceled debt is that debt incurred in one year and canceled in a later year reflects an accession to wealth that ought to be taxable. The conventional account naturalizes the tax in a way that obscures its present function and history. This Article seeks to clarify its present function and recover its history. Modern credit markets grew, in part, because of policy decisions in the 1970s and 1980s to manage distributional conflict with credit. As Professor Abbye Atkinson has argued, easy access to credit and a shrinking welfare state meant that credit replaced direct transfers of cash as our primary form of social provision. One consequence of these decisions is that the modern tax on canceled debt functions less as a measure of wealth and more as a punitive tax on excessive debt. This Article situates this shift within the context of larger political changes. In the 1980s and 1990s, Congress made changes to tax administration that operationalized the tax in a way that would primarily affect individual debtors. These changes corresponded to a broader shift in the policymaking landscape toward the redistribution of burdens and risk in society. This Article suggests that the tax on canceled debt is the product of these broader political forces and not just the internal logic of tax. This reorientation enriches and deepens existing critiques of our tax and financial systems by revealing how the tax on canceled debt contributes to the regressivity and racial inequity of our federal income tax and contributes to what some scholars term the acoustic separation of credit and debt in federal policy. It also suggests that it is time to reconsider the wisdom of taxing canceled debt. And this Article concludes by proposing changes to tax administration and the tax code that would circumscribe the scope of the tax